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Some notable features of 2008 financial crisis have been 
observed alongside with the comparison of what have been done 
in response to it with those of 1998 Asian financial crisis. 
Asymmetries between U.S. as a debtor with key currency privilege 
and other debtors without the original fortune were observed. It is 
further noticed that the asymmetries would be altered with the 
2008 financial crisis as U.S. became even bigger debtor with the 
crisis not only to others but to herself. A few measures have been 
proposed to reduce the asymmetries. It was thought what were 
required to Asian debtors of 1998 had to be applied similarly to 
the debtor U.S. Massive inflation from many stimulus packages of 
nations was expected. It would surely lead to dollar depreciation, 
and it is speculated that the depreciation would resolve quite 
much of current global imbalance via de facto hard landing. 
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I. Introduction
This essay considers the notable features of 2008 global financial 
crisis originated from the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007 and 
then seeks how Korean economy as one of the East Asian Economies 
should adjust to it. In a general sense, East Asian economies have 
done well in terms of growth, inflation, and balance of payments up to 
the global financial crisis. With some external exchange reserves they 
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have been major players in sustaining the global imbalance associated 
with U.S. economy. In spite of the dispute on the excessiveness of 
foreign exchange reserves in individual economies and serious worry on 
hard landing in the way of resolving U.S. cumulative deficits of balance 
of payments, East Asian economies including Korea continued to keep 
lending real resources by means of positive current account balance. 
They also passively accepted what were going on in American finance 
industry including complicated trading of so called derivative products.
All of sudden, this picture was made to change due to the global 
financial crisis of 2008. Korean economy could not avoid direct 
influences from the decline of the value of financial products they 
bought from U.S. financial firms and indirect influences from the 
decline in global demand and the alterations in interest rates, stock 
prices and exchange rates. Hence, it turns necessary to ponder about 
how the Korean economy will be affected by the spilt-over crisis and 
how she should respond to it.
In Section 2, a few notable features of U.S. financial crisis and her 
handling of the financial crisis are examined. The handling altered de 
facto financial architecture maintained up to 2008; almost removal of 
the investment banks, a new posture arising from the previous 
market-first-ism of neo-liberalism to the active government involvement 
in the form of ad hoc rule changes in central bank’s help to financial 
sector, and then the hasty decision by administrative part of 
government to use public money being echoed by legislative part 
thereafter. In Section 3, with the yardstick of old safety net in domestic 
finance, the responses of U.S. authority is compared with those 
materialized in the Asian financial crisis of 1998. In Section 4, the 
effects of the crisis to Korean economy are examined. A few arguments 
explaining why East Asian economies continued to retain large external 
reserves are recalled and re-cast to see whether the reason for it would 
still be maintained. Based on these considerations and especially on 
the differences between U.S. and non-key currency economy like Korea, 
a few long term considerations are recast in Section 5 and final 
remarks are made in Section 6.  
    
II. The Nature of 2008 U.S. Financial Crisis: Symptoms, 
Causes, and Responses
The most vivid symptom of U.S. financial crisis was credit crisis 
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where banks refused to lend to other banks, panicking hedge funds 
pulled out cash from investment banks, money market funds ‘broke 
the buck’ and CDSs (credit default swap), which is a financial 
insurance policy against potential bankruptcy, were traded at prices 
around 30 times what they would normally command. Pension funds 
and college endowments withdrew their money and many escaped from 
stocks, bonds, and money market funds to Treasury Bond.  
The root cause of U.S. financial crisis was the burst of housing 
bubble followed by lots of foreclosures. Obligators of derivative products 
derived from mortgage loans were enforced to experience liquidity 
shortage together with capital depletion, and that was amplified by fair 
value accounting practice. They were forced to sell assets to obtain 
liquidity and to fill the depleted asset value, and this led further fall of 
asset prices. Vicious circle of asset sale → asset price fall → further 
asset sale mobilized some fire-sales and recession train. Fears induced 
demand for cash and flight to such safety asset as Treasury Bond 
accelerated the recession train.
Even with the introduction of subprime mortgage loans, unsound 
credit card loans and car loans all counted as original product, the 
2008 U.S. financial crisis could have been avoided if there were not too 
much securitization with such derivative products as MBS(mortgage 
backed security), ABS(asset backed security), CDO(collateralized debt 
obligation) and SIV(structured investment vehicle), supported morally 
hazardous actions of rating companies1 and de facto insurance scheme 
represented by CDS. CDOs were supposed to be high quality product 
containing super senior slice free of risk. With the fat fee, however, 
their quality had deteriorated, especially when they were combined 
with CDS. The development process of CDOs and CDSs hinted how a 
product initially devised to insulate against risks became misused 
towards concentrated danger. Through the busy process of trading 
these securitized products, especially highly complex computer-generated 
esoteric derivatives with least regulation by humans, the final bearer of 
debts were blurred and the counterparties of the financial transactions 
were vaporized with less than due concern on counterparty risk. 
Against the criticism on it as the weapon of financial mass destruction, 
1 It is surprising that some subprime mortgage-backed securities and CDOs 
with triple-A rating ommanded higher return relative to other triple-A papers 
probably in the ignorance of basic relationship between risk and return. M. 
Knight, “Weaknesses revealed in the market turmoil: where do we go from 
here?” BIS speeches, April 8, 2008.
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technology, and financial engineering happened to run ahead of men in 
both dealing them and monitoring them. This feature was more 
prominent with respect to over-the-counter products than exchange 
traded products.
Asymmetric moral hazard behavior of derivative traders in pursuing 
more trade in the face of big bonus when the trade turned out 
successful vis-à-vis no serious penalty when trade turned out sour 
encouraged more than due risk taking, drove too much trade of 
off-balance sheet items. Proliferation of financial engineering confused 
risk management and led one to believe the risk redistribution via new 
financial instruments to be a means of risk elimination. The belief 
brought some discounting of risk and embedded a bias to more 
production and trade of derivatives together with another bias to 
pro-cyclicality of financing. In addition, it must be pointed out, the 
active securitization enabling many investment banks and various 
funds to make considerable money had not been sustainable without 
the ample liquidities in the financial market made available by the lax 
monetary policy regime which utilized interest rates more than 
monetary aggregate variables as its main tool. As criticized with the 
coined word of Greenspan put, too much liquidity had been made 
available to accommodate the increasing transactions of new financial 
products. Moreover, the lax environment was accompanied by insuf- 
ficient regulatory efforts inter-mixed with the lack of appropriate 
regulatory implementation for new kinds of financial transactions. A 
natural result was the high leverage in financial firms associated with 
ample bubble-yielding behavior without due concern on hidden risk. 
The process propelled itself until liquidity dried up and funding became 
difficult.
For many derivatives even the total volume of their transaction was 
unknown and for some derivatives there were also no responsible 
monitoring eyes.2 This feature gains its significance when there were 
hundreds of private equity funds and hedge funds alongside with 
investment banks, off-balance sheet vehicles in a guise of shadow 
banking taking maximum advantage of high leverage ratios associated 
with them. 
2 It is surprising to notice a circular moral hazard that even CDS depended 
on how Moody’s and S&P labeled A.I.G.’s credit risk and rating companies 
earned their income from the rated, whereas much of the panic associated with 
CDS stemmed from A.I.G.’s CDS. New York Times, “Rated F for Failure.” March 
16, 2009.
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Current crisis had brought many new notable features in the scene 
dealing with the development of crisis. Firstly, the combined team of 
U.S. Treasury department and Federal Reserve appeared, and took the 
driver’s seat at early stage of crisis, bypassing usual prior step of 
mobilizing the inter-bank-market based on the cooperation of financial 
institutions. Secondly, the cause for central bank involvement, especially 
with respect to investment bank, was unusual, being explained with 
the expression ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ rather than the traditional 
one of ‘too-big-to-fail’ applied to commercial bank. Indeed, up to the 
date of Treasury’s rescue of Lehman Brothers there was no justification 
for employing the lender-of-the-last-resort save ‘too-big-to-fail’ cases, in 
contrast. Federal Reserve moved a step forward when it bought 
commercial paper at the money market, as it implied a lending by the 
central bank to private companies.3 Thirdly, there was no consistency 
in handling various kinds of institutions engaged in providing liquidity 
supply and public money. There was no good explanation on why 
Merrill Lynch was put to bankruptcy when Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley were salvaged to become bank holding company. The decision 
not to help AIG and then the overnight reversal of it was another 
example of ad hoc behavior, probably owing to the logic of either 
too-big-to-fail or too-interconnected-to-fail adopted conveniently under 
the fear of many unknown counterparty risks.
As banks hoarded even the money from public sources in the crisis 
the financial crisis worsened the real sector of economy inviting 
another vicious circle of vanishing paychecks, falling home prices and 
diminishing spending. In this dimension stabilization of the financial 
sector was merely a critical first step, but no more. In order to 
disconnect the negative spiral of default and falling prices the 
uncertainties surrounding foreclosure have to be eliminated as an 
essential step to finalize the crisis. Moreover, even the return to normal 
financial market functioning may not prevent a full-fledged recession of 
job cuts, it is contemplated, unless there were enough government 
stimulus spending and tax cuts to both households and businesses, in 
addition to the stabilization of financial sector.
3
It may not be illegal since Federal Reserve Act article 13(3) gave the Board of 
Governors the power to authorize Federal Reserve banks to make loans to any 
individual, partnership, or corporation provided that the borrower is unable to 
obtain credit from a banking institution. S. Cecchetti, “Crisis and Response: The 
Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008.” NBER working paper 
14134, 2008.
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U.S. crisis propagated to other economies on the globe in rendering 
tremendous fall in stock market indices and big alterations in 
exchange rates. It became the global crisis from U.S. crisis, as the 
globalization looked to have interlocked fragilities all over globe. The 
impact appeared bigger in Europe (as Europe had dealt with more 
derivative products than other regions save U.S.) at first as the 
European Central Bank was unable to monitor comprehensively and to 
exercise concentrated action in front of national central banks of 
individual countries against the contagion of financial turmoil. In the 
end it propagated to all economies and the global financial crisis 
thereafter looked to inhibit functioning of all credit markets of the 
global village.
III. U.S. Responses Compared with the Responses of the 
1998 Asian Financial Crisis
A. Safety Net in Normal Domestic Setting was Broken in Both 
Crises
In order to evaluate the above U.S. responses in comparison with the 
corresponding ones of the 1998 Asian crisis, various rescue instru- 
ments in the orthodox safety nets in domestic setting would better be 
recalled as yardstick.
In domestic finance there is 3-stair ladder of safety net. At the 
bottom stair of the ladder, individual firms are encouraged to operate 
prudently with due risk prevention measures. They are urged to 
operate internal check and balance system and external audit 
apparatus. If the firms concerned were financial firms with higher 
leverage than usual manufacturing firms they are additionally subject 
to the monitoring and regulation by respective supervisory authorities.
In the middle stair of individual efforts exists the voluntary 
cooperative mechanism among participants of the market. Guarding 
against the possibility of liquidity shortages any of them can experience, 
the participants used to formulate a pool and let those in need of 
liquidity among them to use the pooled resources. Inter-bank market 
offers the best example of the middle stair.
In the top stair exists the lender of the last resort (LLR). When the 
suspicions of bank clients are very significant and therefore even the 
pooling mechanism of inter-bank market is judged to be insufficient to 
avoid the possibility of bank run, the LLR is activated. Unlimited 
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resources based on printing power of the central bank are mobilized for 
the sake of the individual banks under suspicion of liquidity shortage, 
and thereupon the bank runs are avoided. Considering the fact that 
the liquidity outside the banking system can not but be returned back 
to the banking system sooner or later, it can be noted, the functioning 
of the LLR turns out very secure and effective.
Evaluated with the yardstick of domestic finance noted above, it can 
be said, the measures in the bottom stair were not functioning in both 
crises and those in the middle stair were useless, as to be shown. In 
contrast, the LLR was employed excessively in U.S. crisis, whereas it 
was insufficient in Asian crisis.
Both U.S. crisis and Asian crisis burst as individual firms there had 
not operated prudently enough with due risk prevention measures. 
They had been negligent of the danger from maturity mismatch in 
particular. They did not meet the transparency requirement in carrying 
out the transformation of long term credit with short term debt and in 
dealing with dubious instruments in the process of transformation. 
In the U.S. economy the financial scene started with the cash 
product like loans and bonds as usual, but sooner or later the firms 
there bundled and re-bundled those cash products to make MBSs, 
ABSs, CDOs, and SIVs. However, most firms utilizing these new 
instruments were negligent of further intensifying the degree of internal 
check and balance system and external audit apparatus corre- 
spondingly. The very fact that they were made subject to financial 
crisis testified that they needed more upgraded due diligence and more 
powerful safety measures beyond those employed in their usual 
operation. Thereupon, they ended up with crisis and emergency 
measures observed these days. 
In Asian financial crisis, in contrast, many Asian firms dominated by 
the excessive pressure of ample liquidity were interested in sending 
money, at least some part of it, made available from outsiders’ portfolio 
investment, to overseas economies and to other investment opportuni- 
ties, without due care on the maturity mismatch arising from short- 
term debt and long-term investment hidden in those endeavors.4  
Because there was no adequate prudential regulation to check the 
maturity mismatch in both U.S. and Asian economies, they were driven 
4
It is tricky how to understand Japan’s lost decade in this context, as the 
enlarged difficulties were often regarded being mainly caused by delayed 
work-out of crisis situation. 
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to face crisis.
B. Response Measures Employed in the U.S. Crisis Context
In the U.S. handling of 2008 financial crisis, she overlooked individual 
efforts of firms at the bottom stair. It was reported that around one 
third of firms under SEC supervision had failed to file the required 
documents5 and that SEC found that its division to oversee trading 
and market had not adequately reviewed many of the filings made by 
other firms. All institutions were in trouble from the beginning owing 
to their respective failure to observe due protective measures to prevent 
liquidity shortage by means of appropriate monitoring mechanism 
internally and externally. 
In addition, when crisis burst out there was no possibility for an 
active use of inter-bank market since the possibility presupposed some 
healthy financial firms besides ailing firms from its beginning, whereas 
there were little healthy and big firms. Most financial firms suffered 
credit squeeze. Universal banks experienced decline in asset value and 
forced to write down the accounting losses from their investment 
banking arms. Stand alone investment banks were in worse condition 
without backing of their own liquidity pool from deposit taking. 
Insurance companies were in trouble having been actively involved in 
handling quasi-insurance business associated with CDS, whose 
valuation was the most difficult without historical data to fall back on 
when setting the insurance premium. Lacking a reliable clearing 
mechanism for it, it was obvious that the default of CDSs would bring 
chain reaction of derivatives it had insured, and it would surely bring 
in extreme liquidity freeze of many financial companies beyond 
imagination. 
Most financial firms were infected in the credit squeeze process. Even 
normal insurance companies without CDS dealing were affected when 
they experienced bigger cash outflows than inflows from the credit 
squeeze. They were forced to sell good assets to make up liquidity 
shortage and then faced the need for write down of tainted assets 
together with supplementation of depreciated capital. In the end 
repercussions to the real side of the economy was regarded the most 
critical concern lest vicious spiral of mortgage loan reach others such 
as card loans and car loans. In that case too many firms would be 
5
The source of 1/3 is the article at the footnote 1 above.
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affected with lots of tainted assets. Small and medium-sized firms 
would suffer more than big firms in this occasion. Even IT firms at 
Silicon Valley were rumored to face hardship in getting usual venture 
capital. 
In short, most institutions which were supposed to have spare 
liquidity to help their companions in the U.S. usual internal inter-bank 
market were simultaneously in short of liquidity, negating the availa- 
bility of inter-bank market. Consequently, they had actually to pass 
the pooling of extra liquidities in the form of inter-bank framework in 
the middle ladder.
U.S. asked other developed countries for liquidity help, and this can 
be understood to be an attempt of utilizing inter-bank framework, not 
U.S. internal but U.S. external. She also requested them to participate 
in bail-outs of their respective economies in the hope that the parallel 
bail-outs by all of them carried out simultaneously would mitigate 
uncertainties in the global financial markets. 
In order to keep business to function with credits and banks to 
function continuously with the ability to draw on one another’s 
resources as needed, the key measure U.S. resorted in the end was the 
final stair of LLR.  Initially at least, U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve 
tried to show their behavior as observing the traditional principle of 
LLR, lending only to commercial banks that were under the supervision 
of Federal Reserve. Indeed, Federal Reserve coined a strange mechanism 
of lending to a commercial bank JP Morgan Chase with the condition 
that the JP Morgan Chase used the money in assisting (buying) an 
investment bank Bear Sterns, even at the risk of condoning moral 
hazard behavior of the aggressive risk taker Bear Sterns. In this case it 
tried at least formerly abiding the logic and tradition of LLR lending 
only to commercial banks, even though in the backside it unveiled the 
logic of too-interconnected-to-fail instead of orthodox one of too-big-to- 
fail to rationalize the dubious action. However, the initial position could 
not be sustained further when Treasury Secretary asked 700 billion 
dollars of super-jumbo package a little later.    
Restored supply of emergency liquidity in the work-out process must 
attain multiple objectives. In addition to unlocking credit markets and 
supplanting dried liquidity to keep credits flowing to businesses and 
consumers the workout program should involve the tasks of (1) 
removed bad debts at the asset side of balance sheets of financial 
firms, (2) preventing of deposit runs associated with the liability side of 
balance sheet and (3) strengthening of capital. When these tasks 
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cannot be carried out simultaneously some priority among them has 
better to be set.
In handling the bad assets in the asset side including restructuring 
of the existing mortgages and derivatives, appropriate prices for various 
kinds of bad assets of ailing companies, some being worthless or 
impossible to value, should be discovered such that the revenue from 
sales could help the impaired institutions to revive with strengthened 
capital base. With respect to the mortgage restructuring in particular, it 
should be ended up to a substantial decrease of foreclosure by means 
of lowering interest rates, of extending payment schedule, and then to 
prevention of further decline in housing prices as well. 
It must be noticed that the implementation of work-out along the 
above scheme would be very delicate as there are conflicts of interest 
between the firms with bad assets and the carrier of work-out. If the 
work-out forces the bank to book big losses it would be self-defeating 
as it would let banks unable to resume lending with strengthened 
capital. Otherwise, if it buys the assets at the value at which banks are 
keeping them on their balance sheets, tax payers will almost certainly 
be over-paying. Even if reverse auction is to be employed such that 
final prices are to be determined by how many banks are willing to sell 
bad assets, there would be many bad assets without relevant market 
negating the application of reverse auction scheme in all cases. Indeed 
there is still suspicion that even the reverse auction might not work for 
such heterogeneous objects as derivatives or their part of tranches 
classified by the investors’ appetite for the risk. 
Supplement to it the avoidance of bank run is urgent. Some 
guaranteeing if not nationalization may be necessary. In order to avoid 
bank run and money market break to accommodate the credit needs of 
businesses and households and to protect fragile inter-bank market, 
the guaranteeing of all deposits at banks would be an easy way 
retaining the most immediate impact. However, in this case, there 
would follow a hazard of too much lending. At the extreme the 
deposit-taking banks can be nationalized, at least temporarily. 
The capital being the final base of operation of financial firms must 
be enlarged and strengthened, but it should not stay there after 
injection in the form of hoarding cash. Anyhow, all these are never 
easy objectives to attain simultaneously. Thereupon discretion of bank- 
ruptcy judge to moderate mortgage conditions may be desirable as a 
supplement to it. In the meantime when the public money was to be 
lent the interest rate was supposed to be punitive as required by the 
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logic of LLR and exemplified in the case of AIG. 
The above consideration on the balance sheet items of ailing 
financial firms is directly related with the specific issue on how the 
public money was to be best used. Before the fixing of the sequence of 
work-out one easy way which might have immediate effect to take is to 
inject the public money to the troubled institutions in the Wall Street 
by means of buying devalued equities and let the capital-strengthened 
institutions appropriately eliminate or at least mitigate the bad assets 
in most efficient way. This choice assumes that the troubled firms 
know best about the bad assets with lots of inside information and 
they are the experts to carry out work-out task. However, this turns 
out nothing but to hand over authority to those who misbehaved to 
make the trouble at the beginning. 
Another way is to use the public money to purchase mortgage loans 
directly wherever they are, noticing that by attacking the bad assets at 
the root it would much facilitate mortgage adjustment thereafter. The 
difficulty of this method is that the where-about of initial mortgages 
was hard to identify as they were bundled and re-bundled in the 
process of being made into MBSs and ABSs, and then CDOs and SIVs. 
Therefore it inevitably would take rather long time delaying required 
quick responses.
When the proposition that the central concern of current crisis is 
nothing but the crisis of trust is recalled, equity injection into the 
financial institutions looks most preferable.6 It may have quick impact 
on restoring confidence by substituting credibility of banks with the 
credibility of government through de facto nationalization, at least 
partially, and by constraining too active role of investment bankers of 
Wall Street suspicious of being the originators of the crisis. 
In case the equity injection was taken with respect to financial 
institutions, succeeding issue is how to handle the difficulties of auto 
industry and airline industry, recalling that these are also critical 
industry whose failure has to be avoided in consideration of employment 
and trust re-habilitation. 
Another concern is how the public money is to be distributed among 
various financial institutions under alternative regulatory schemes. 
6
There is a question on whether the financial institutions referred here would 
include insurance companies. Since the liabilities of insurance companies are 
usually long term unlike short term deposits of bank liability the insurance 
companies may better be left out from the need of emergency capital injection.
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Effects of regulatory arbitrage must be taken into account in view of 
competitive guaranteeing among countries in infusing money to 
guaranteed big institutions and non-guaranteed small institutions in an 
individual country as usual and similarly so to banks with deposit 
guarantee by their respective government and banks without it. 
Incidentally, there might be unexpected capital outflows out of less safe 
economies to safe economies, whereas the former would be emerging 
economies and the latter would be developed economies. 
U.S. Treasury seems abandoned its plan to buy toxic assets of banks 
directly, bypassing the fundamental solution of removing rotten apples 
from the rotten basket for a moment. In the face of the shift of the 
Treasury stance to aid financial firms other non-bank institutions such 
as insurers, student loan companies were lined up for the liquidity 
injection. However, these were less likely to circulate the injected 
money to real economy than banks as they might have to meet their 
respective regulatory requirements ahead of it, or they would intend to 
acquire weaker rivals against the gloomy psychology which could 
render banking crisis into economic crisis. Moreover, if many institu- 
tions were aided with public money injection a danger of horrible 
inflation in later days with an inevitable massive printing of money 
must be expected. 
With respect to regulatory failure and too much liquidity, there were 
reviews of past financial regime. The question had arisen why derivatives 
were not adequately regulated and how the shadow banking apparatus 
attained the high leverage ratio around 30 in distinction to the 
counterpart of it for commercial bank with BIS ratio of 8%.7 It was 
noticed that the effort by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
at 2003 to regulate options and futures had been opposed by Greenspan 
and then secretary of Treasury Rubin on the principle that too many 
rules would damage Wall Street and that even merely discussing new 
rules would threaten the derivative markets.8 The good will of Wall 
7 It was surprising to notice that at the end of February 2008 Bear Sterns 
had roughly $12 billion in capital to support just under $400 billion in assets. 
S. Cecchetti, “Crisis and Response: The Federal Reserve and The Financial 
Crisis of 2007-2008.” NBER working paper 14134, 2008.
8
In later date, however, he conceded error by admitting that Greenspan had 
put too much faith in the self-correcting power of free markets by confessing an 
error in assuming that markets would properly regulate themselves and failed 
to anticipate the self-destructive power of wanton mortgage lending without an 
idea a financial disaster was making. New York Times, “Greenspan Concedes 
Error on Regulation.” 10/24/2008. 
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Street to self-regulate was very much trusted to fend off restrictions by 
the authorities at the time, and then had met the criticism later for not 
disciplining institutions that lent indiscriminately. In spite of the 
Greenspan’s belief that not the derivative contracts but the greed and 
dishonest of people who made contracts was to blame, it turned out, 
re-regulation and system modification to restore trust and confidence 
was regarded essential to fill the gaps and weaknesses in the regulatory 
oversight. Some additional measures to discourage excessive risk taking 
were considered necessary, too.
  
C. Safety Nets in Asian Financial Crisis Context
The above developments in the U.S. are somewhat different from 
what went on in the 1997 Asian crisis. At the bottom stair a few 
means had been suggested and strongly emphasized as self-help 
measures of the Asian firms. First of all Asian developing countries 
were advised to maintain a transparent system even after the fact of 
financial crisis. In this way, it was reasoned, these countries would be 
made to secure confidence from foreign investors. With the same kind 
of reasoning, these economies were recommended to have adequate 
risk management system to rule out excessive risk taking associated 
with moral hazard behavior. More concretely, they were urged not to 
accumulate excessive short-term foreign debts. One step further, they 
were advised to set up a legal and bankruptcy system that was very 
similar to investors’ corresponding ones. To put it critically, Asian 
countries wanting to utilize external capital were asked to develop 
institutions very friendly to foreign investors. Unlike U.S. firms under 
U.S. handling of 2008 crisis, Asian financial firms were urged to 
behave prudently in relation with the bottom stair even after the fact 
that they were in the crisis with the past inadequate behavior. 
Accumulation of lots of foreign exchange reserves was considered to 
be a good way to increase foreigners’ confidence as an economy with 
ample reserves was usually regarded essential to be able to repay more 
easily than otherwise the short-term debts, which were so often the 
seed of difficulties in many crisis occasions. Another policy recom- 
mended for Asian debtor country to follow was to discriminate among 
the modes of capital movements. She might further prefer direct 
investments by the foreigners themselves to the portfolio investments, 
because in the case of foreign direct investment foreigners assume a 
larger responsibility when things turned out bad. She might prefer 
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equity financing to debt financing among portfolio financing, and 
because the former involved larger burden sharing by foreigners. 
Similarly an active invitation for the presence of foreign banks was 
advised, as foreign banks were considered to have their own reputation 
independent of the difficulties of the economy they were doing business 
in. Even with the loss of confidence of local institutions during the 
financial crisis, foreign banks were regarded remain free from the 
contamination and thus be able to supply financial services normally. 
Accordingly, in order to secure continuous financial services, Asian 
economies were advised to invite foreign banks9 and this was expected 
to enlarge external interbank market.
It was regarded at least up to the de facto end of Asian crisis that, 
in this safety-feature-insufficient global financial environment, the most 
an individual economy could pursue were: to clean its house with 
respect to the issues of transparency, corporate governance, prudential 
regulatory system, and sound management of macroeconomic policies. 
If there occurred a crisis even with the effort of house cleaning, it 
should further strengthen the intensity of stabilization policies thus far 
taken and then ask external financial assistance to IMF and others. 
Being non-key-currency economy non of them were able to mobilize 
new liquidity individually against the credit freeze from the crisis. 
Instead, it was advised that the extent of strengthening and magnitude 
of financial package would better be larger erring on the excessive side 
than insufficient side. Worsening of crisis dynamics due to less than 
sufficient adjustment package and external financial resources was 
taken much more seriously than the foregone cost involved in excessive 
erring (or overshooting). In short, in striking distinction to U.S. troubled 
firms, Asian troubled firms were requested on so many fronts even 
after the crisis up-rise. 
To our surprise, however, they were medicine after the fact instead of 
being remedial means, as 1998 crisis had burst when these advices 
were rendered. In this sense the bottom ladder was of no effect in the 
1998 Asian crisis. Moreover, they were very different from what U.S. 
employed in 2008.
It must be emphasized that at the backside of the above negativistic 
9
This point was very strongly stressed by Allen H. Meltzer, “Asian Problems 
and the IMF” in the Cato Journal Vol. 17, No. 3. It is ironic though, Asian 
economies suffered the sudden pull initiated by foreign financial firms in 2008 
crisis.
 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 AND THE KOREAN ECONOMY 195
response in the Asian crisis there was some powerful potential 
contribution of source countries and creditors in alleviating and 
preventing financial crisis, if debtors were unable to work themselves 
out. However, surprisingly enough again, at the time of Asian crisis the 
obligations of creditor countries had not received due attention. U.S. 
occupied creditor position even if U.S. was the biggest net debtor of the 
world at that time, and she with IMF demanded much adjustment of 
macroeconomic policy undertakings of Asian debtor countries as 
necessary conditions of renovated international financial architecture. 
Behaving as a creditor country she was not interested in taking what 
would better be adopted as the creditor country, let alone helping 
debtors to take their respective self-help measures just like she took 
herself at the 2008 crisis. Even the accident of LTCM in 1998 was 
ignored irrelevant to be a factor for renovating the international financial 
architecture.
At the middle stair of safety net there was an attempt in Asia to 
establish a regional fund as for an inter-bank market. The thesis for 
Asian Monetary Fund was examined in relation with the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis to establish a cooperative pooling mechanism for Asian 
region, a subset of the world. However, it could not be materialized as 
U.S. opposed to the idea with the reasoning that AMF might weaken 
IMF. Thereafter discussions around AMF submerged as for a device for 
resolving Asian financial difficulties. 
Without an ability to mobilize LLR autonomously, not being a key 
currency country, Asian emerging economies had to seek the LLR from 
outside. However, in the world economy there is no LLR. G7 countries 
were negativistic on the formulation of new global institutions like The 
World Central Bank. Not only being unable to mobilize LLR themselves 
autonomously but also Asian countries could not have outside LLR at 
their disposal at the top ladder. Accordingly, to Asian economies the 
best hope was strengthening of de facto LLR associated with IMF, even 
if it was too often mentioned that the current IMF was too small in 
resource endowment to assume the normal role of de facto international 
LLR. It was sensed that G7 was not prepared to put up the kind of 
resources needed to preclude any serious problem in international 
finance and to make the IMF as for the World Central Bank to handle 
a broad-based attack on developing country debt problem and interna- 
tional bank runs associated with it.  
De facto LLR help came with various conditions under the auspice of 
IMF during Asian financial crisis with alternative strengths to alternative 
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troubled Asian economies. To Asian economies the very liquidity in 
short of was foreign exchanges and at the crisis time current account 
transactions were insufficient to generate necessary exchange for 
meeting usual expenditures in foreign exchanges whereas capital inflows 
were significantly reduced. So called sudden stop was there. But LLR 
help was not sufficient.
In this hard situation the deficit in the balance of payments was 
diagnosed to come from over-valued local currency fundamentally, 
while capitals escaped due to low interest rate. Thereupon, activating 
LLR by mobilizing internal monetary resources was irrelevant, and 
enhancement of interest rates to curb capital outflows and to induce 
capital inflows was noted major remedy. Adoption of free exchange rate 
system in replacement of fixed exchange rates which tended to preserve 
overvalued local currency was another important measure.   
It is worthwhile to notice that this understanding around G7 and 
IMF was in good contrast with the position of the UNCTAD. UNCTAD 
recognized the self-evident benefits of the method of establishing codes 
and standards to help strengthen domestic financial systems of debtor 
countries, but noted that of itself it entailed neither a fundamental 
change in policies and practices of source countries nor improvements 
in the transparency and regulation of currently unregulated cross- 
border financial operations. It brought under spotlight the importance 
of standard-abiding by source countries of international finance in 
parallel to that of recipient countries.10 Moreover, the UNCTAD report 
touched upon the regional arrangements as a means to provide collective 
defense mechanisms against systemic failures and instability, observing 
that regional currencies were increasingly seen as viable alternatives to 
dollarization. It weakly responded to the need of having the middle 
ladder in the global financial architecture.
IV. The Effects of the Global Crisis to the Korean 
Economy
All the above changes in the 2008 U.S. financial sector have negative 
10 It further noted that there was a danger that the incentives and sanctions 
linked to standard-setting would become features of IMF surveillance and 
conditionality, compliance with which would place a further heavy burden on 
the administrative capacities of many countries despite the emphasis of their 
voluntary adoption. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 2001.
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effect to East Asian economies in general, and Korean economy in 
particular. Beleaguered foreign banks pulled out their credit lines 
constituting a sudden pull (in distinction to sudden stop in 1998), 
exports by East Asian economies to developed economies suffered. In 
short, just like other non-U.S., non-European and non-East Asian 
economies like Brazil, Algentina, Turkey, Russia, India, and Indonesia 
Korean economy cannot avoid the spill-over of U.S. difficulties originated 
from the financial turmoil.
Korea like other non-U.S. economies happened to have various 
effects. They witnessed a fall in their asset prices made of instruments 
issued by contaminated U.S. financial institutions (investment banks, 
hedge funds, AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac etc.) in the form of 
equities, bonds, and other derivatives. They were placed under an 
uncertainty about how their investments would recover the original 
value. They experienced the fluctuations in their interest rates, stock 
indices and exchange rates, more or less in parallel with the fluctua- 
tions in related U.S. price signals. Bank credits were curtailed and 
credit evaluation became more conservative with decline of trust and 
confidence to lead to higher interest rates at least to a number of 
individual debtors. Renewal in money market had been made difficult, 
freezing the way of obtaining liquidity by issuing commercial paper. 
The impact from the financial side to the real side would be much 
more amplified if financial crisis were to be expanded to include others 
such as card loans and car loans.
Many companies suffered, and small and medium companies 
suffered more than large companies that had more cushions as usual. 
Housing prices fell alongside with loan depreciation. Thereupon, jobs 
were decreased enforcing more modest ways of living. Government 
spending not related with financial restructuring would surely be 
curtailed giving further shadow to real economy unless government 
increases its spending against upcoming recession. Some pension plans 
that invested heavily in financial assets were severely depreciated, 
aggravating market mood. Thereupon, the competitiveness of Korea 
were impaired and its sustainability weakened. 
However, Korean economy unlike others retained a few conditions to 
do relatively well in enduring crisis. The reason for this judgment 
would be: she had higher savings rates, she used to have current 
account surpluses, she happened to have somewhat strengthened 
regulatory system after her suffering of 1998 Asian financial crisis, and 
she would be better positioned to take advantage of the potential of 
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resource price fall as being a resource-poor economy. With these 
conditions and constraints she had to survive the spilt-over effects of 
global financial crisis. She may have to participate at a cooperative 
arrangement of lowering interest rates all together to boost aggregate 
demand and of placing some public money to impaired spots with bad 
assets. Against this background there appear a few agenda Korea 
would better concentrate on in adjustment to changed situation with 
long run perspective.
V. Longer-run Consideration for the Korean Economy
In view of the differences in the undertakings observed between the 
2008 U.S. crisis and the 1998 Asian crisis a few things need to be 
rethought (re-considered) for the Korean economy being a non-key- 
currency country. This becomes more urgent when G20 which may 
replace G7 at least partly with new members from emerging economies 
may fail to establish a new international financial architecture and to 
materialize a coordinated fiscal stimulus to counter global downturn. 
Important among them are the preparation for a possibility of newly 
emerging key currencies beside dollar, the choice of exchange rate 
system, and further intensification of cooperation between creditors 
and debtors. 
A. Regional Cooperation for Asian Currency Unit
The most critical concern for regional cooperation at the moment 
would be an establishment of regional currency, as Asia may need 
their own currency that can par with U.S. dollar and European Euro. 
These days Yen and Yuan are recognized to be major currency even if 
both are not actively traded key currency like dollar or Euro.  
The prime reason for a country to have one’s own currency is to 
secure seigniorage gain, as is well known. By issuing a currency whose 
production cost is far less than its purchasing power the issuing 
authority secures considerable resources denoted as seigniorage. 
During current de facto dollar standard U.S. has enjoyed tremendous 
segniorage gain from the trade, not only from her own economy 
internally but also from other countries externally. In the backside of 
the fact that most economies use dollar as their transaction vehicle in 
lots of trade and in their international financial transactions, U.S. thus 
far has obtained huge gains. With the appearance of Euro recently, of 
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course, the monopoly position of U.S. dollar as the exclusive interna- 
tional vehicle currency has been a little challenged. The monopoly 
position has been changed into duopoly position. But U.S. remains the 
leader of the duopoly. 
On the opposite side of U.S. monopoly of seniorage gain Asian 
economies had to pay the foregone cost of seigniorage loss. With the 
change of U.S. monopoly into the duopoly by U.S. and Europe, Asian 
economies are still destined to have to pay the foregone cost 
continuously, even if the cost in the duopoly situation could have been 
smaller owing to the little competition associated with the two duopolist 
than the previous dollar monopolist.
Asian currency could be created in parallel to dollar and Euro 
breaking the status quo. If created it could save the seignorage loss 
Asian economies have thus far burdened. It would also alleviate the 
burden of other non-Asian and non-U.S. and non-European countries, 
as the competition by three would imply intense competition than 
duopoly competition and thereupon lower seigniorage by the three key 
currency issuers. Furthermore, it could mitigate the difficulties in the 
resolution process of so called global imbalance.
In addition to the seigniorage gain, Asian economies and others 
could further be benefited owing to smaller international reserves and 
less fluctuating exchange rates, which in turn are to be made feasible 
due to three competing major currencies. The proposal for Asian 
Currency Unit (ACU) is worth further reexamination in this front.11 
In the past years Japan sent balance-of-payments surpluses to the 
U.S. mainly by means of purchasing U.S. Treasury Bonds. However, by 
investing that way Japan has incurred lots of capital losses in the 
back side of secular exchange rate alteration between dollar and yen 
into the direction of dollar depreciation and yen appreciation due to 
U.S. current account deficits and Japanese current account surpluses. 
In order to avoid the capital losses Japan has continuously demanded 
U.S. to issue treasury bonds denominated in yen. The Japanese desire 
to avoid capital losses with the adoption of yen-denominated bond is 
best noticed by the abortive bonds associated with the names of U.S. 
presidents; Carter bond, Reagan bond, Bush bond, and Clinton 
bond.12 China having the largest foreign exchange reserves in the 
11
In early 80’s there was the discussion on the third world money. Its idea 
was to save the foregone senioage by using U.S. dollar, and therefore of the 
same spirit as the Asian money.
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world is not different from Japan being in the disadvantaged position 
in this regard.
Japan and China can divert the capital they thus far invested in the 
U.S. sacrificing capital losses, and utilize it in the Asia for the creation 
of Asian currency. For this purpose, of course, they do not have to 
reorient all capital she sent to U.S., as Asian economies are relatively 
small and need relatively smaller emergency liquidity. They can start 
utilizing a part of the capital directed to U.S. to ignite a first step for 
regional monetary cooperation and ameliorate the subtle situation of 
global imbalance.       
At this juncture a few features can be further recalled. Firstly, it 
must be remembered again that current day Japan is well positioned 
to assume the major lender’ role for Asia, which is prerequisite for the 
economy providing key currency in the region. Japan has been running 
current account surplus continuously, especially vis-à-vis Asian econo- 
mies for last several decades and it looks it will continuously be so in 
the near future. The scheme of currency swap among 14 Asian countries 
can be considered a positive step into making of Asian currency, in 
addition to the 200 million dollars of swap among ASEAN 6. Further 
swap agreement between Korea, China and Japan could be counted in 
this context. Together with the trials utilizing currencies of Asian 
economies in the swap deals the attempt to formulate and stabilize the 
exchange rates could help materialize Asian currency in the coming 
future, as exemplified among Japan, China and Korea. In 2009 
Chingmai initiative was extended to establish a common fund amoun- 
ting 12 billion dollars of which 80% was to be shared by Korea, Japan 
and China with the ratio of 2:4:4, strengthening the momentum of the 
initiative. This point turns out more distinct as U.S. extended swap 
with G7 a few others in dealing with the 2008 financial crisis. 
In a near future Yen-Won swap can be arranged with a background 
scenario that Korea gets Yen and exchange it into dollar. This arrange- 
ment could be a win-win policy as Japan achieves capital export 
denominated in Yen through Korea whereas Korea can procure dollar 
liquidity, even if Korea does not use the Yen swapped as itself directly 
in the market. 
12
There is a concern that the AMF could undermine the leadership role of 
the IMF and foster a split between Asia and North America. F. Bergstern 
suggested Asia Pacific Monetary Fund to mitigate the concern in replacement of 
AMF.
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Secondly, China’s participation at the so-called ‘Asean+3’ process 
associated with the Chiang Mai Initiative can further be expanded. 
With the rise of Chinese economy China’s worry or resistance on 
Japanese domination is quite much removed, hinting China’s probable 
inclination to Asian currency. The most noteworthy response along this 
line is the Chinese plan to spend as a stimulus package U.S.$ 586 
billion over next 2 years. The plan is noteworthy as it is huge next to 
U.S. $700 billion and it is mainly bestowed on investments in real 
sector in contrast to U.S. rescue measures focused on bank normaliza- 
tion.
In the meantime, IMF must be strengthened. Incidentally the IMF’s 
newly devised short term liquidity facility that will disburse 3-month 
loans to countries with good policies and manageable debts looks a 
forward step in this context as it appears not attaching any of its 
usual conditions. Japanese lending to IMF of U.S. $100 billion would 
also enforce IMF activities along the line. The former IMF managing 
director Koehler stated that the IMF and AMF could coexist and that 
.... it is up to the region to decide on an AMF .... in Bangkok during 
his 5-nation Asian tour in June 2000.
When the need for Asian money and the huddles to it are taken into 
account, the materialization of Asian money cannot but be a gradual 
process. The starting point would be the old Miyazawa Plan, with a few 
problems associated with taken care of. Especially, the fact that it uses 
U.S. dollar as the medium of emergency loan looks not compatible with 
the final end of making Asian vehicle currency, and therefore it must 
be changed. 
B. Choice of Exchange Rate System
The exchange rate system is a very important factor of financial 
system deserving an utmost attention for non-key currency economies. 
Concerning the exchange rate system, discussions around G7 at the 
time of the Asian crisis involved as their core the observation that the 
hard peg system (currency board system and dollarization) and free 
float had became a component of new architecture. They were simply 
satisfied at that time with the trend that more countries were taking 
either of these two corner systems away from intermediate arrange- 
ments of adjustable-peg nature. 
They have simply overlooked the difficulties of the hard peg system 
owing to the change into non-autonomous status by relegating its 
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monetary policy to the outside monetary authority when its currency 
was hard pegged. In other words, they did not sympathize with the 
hardship that Argentina faced with her de facto dollarization in the 
form of currency board system. They tended to ignore the agony after 
having given up the monetary policy discretion by abiding rigid fixing 
under the circumstance when the economy experienced a structural 
shift (like change in industrial structure of Algentina from its previous 
one away from U.S.) vis-à-vis dollar under the circumstance when the 
exchange rates among major currencies changed considerably. The 
shift should bring a change in exchange rate in non-dollarized economy, 
but a dollarized economy cannot accommodate it. 
With respect to the free floating, in contrast, they were also least 
mindful at recognizing the pre-conditions for independent floaters, 
consisting of independent central bank, well-regulated financial system, 
efficient fiscal institution, and stable political system, all supported by 
diversified trade and financial linkages. They underestimated the hard 
hidden efforts in the successful free floaters to stabilize the exchange 
rate by means of monetary policy of forward-looking-inflation-targeting 
type and stringent fiscal policy, whereas many economies lacked the 
ability to do so. Without well established infrastructure a mere adoption 
of free flexible rate system would bring unbearable exchange rate 
fluctuations, which create its own difficulty of managing usual trade 
and business. 
Free-floating strategies have their own costs of possible excessive 
volatility and free riding risks. If myopic and system-hurting herd 
behavior cannot be ruled out and thereupon the efficient allocation of 
resources cannot be guaranteed, resulting in high cost of exchange 
rate volatility, the inclination to the perfect capital mobility as a way of 
resolving the so-called tri-lemma (showing the inconsistency of inde- 
pendent monetary policy, fixed exchange rates and free movement of 
capital) may not be warranted. Presumably, having experienced disrup- 
tive misallocation of resources under free floating, many emerging 
economies might have discovered that managed exchange rate strategies 
in the guise of de facto adjustable peg could be the better one for them 
than the two corner solutions, especially for those without well func- 
tioning capital market and various infrastructure developed over long 
period of time to support the well-functioning capital market. This 
implies that the choice of either of corner solutions by emerging 
economies is not necessarily inevitable, implicitly explaining why so 
many emerging economies have de facto adjustable peg after recent 
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financial crises even after having heard of the advice that the two 
choices left to them were either free flexible exchange rates or currency 
board. 
The hardship in choosing appropriate exchange regime of non-U.S. 
economies is not observed at all in the U.S. in the 2008 financial 
crisis. Moreover, U.S. has not bothered about external exchange 
reserves even if she has a little worried about the decline in the real 
value of dollar at the early days, unlike the Asian countries in 1998 
Asian crisis. She did not mind to raise interest rates to encourage 
capital flow into U.S. when she lowered interest rate together with 
additional liquidity supply to supplement the weakened credit circula- 
tion. As a weak gesture she merely invited external sovereign fund in 
this context. There was no role of IMF or any others requesting U.S. on 
the conditions on macroeconomic management, neither.
The prime reason for these differences between Asian economies and 
U.S. originated from the fact that U.S. dollar is the key international 
currency and thereupon by virtue of original fortune she is liberated  
from the difficulties of foreign exchange insufficiency.13 She has the 
luxury of benefitting from the seigniorage by providing dollar as the 
vehicle currency of international transactions beyond her own economic 
territory especially in financial transactions and oil and as the medium 
of external reserves. In U.S. there is no exchange rate problem of other 
countries like Asian economies. She simply let others to keep her 
currency and her-currency-denominated debts as for external reserves 
with little cost to herself.
It is desirable to lesson the degree of this asymmetry between U.S. 
and non-U.S. One way for non-U.S. would be to leave from the two 
corner solutions and adopt adjustable peg where there is some room 
for exercising discretion when emergency situations appear.
The right adjustment may differ depending on the nature of exchange 
market pressure and availability of international reserves, whereas the 
exchange market pressure is usually understood as an excess demand 
for foreign exchange at a certain time. When the main part of exchange 
market pressure is judged to be transitory nature the right response 
would be less variation of exchange rate and more change in reserves, 
13 The original fortune is the work to represent the opposite position of 
‘original sin’ the word once used by Barry Eichengreen to describe the 
unfortunate position of non-key-currency countries. B. Eichengreen and A. 
Moody, “Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility.” NBER working paper 7418, 
1999.
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and vice versa for the pressure of permanent nature. This concern is 
very important with respect to capital movements, as some of them can 
be of the transitory nature.  
Appropriate mix between exchange rate variability and reserve 
alteration to prevent too much rate changes has to be seriously 
considered. Unlike previous days in the past, it should be noticed, the 
capital outflows, from emerging economies during the peak of 2008 
U.S. financial crisis carried by hedge funds, of past carry trades and 
others from developed economies, were of one time nature dominated 
by the sudden pulls in the form of unwinding of past portfolio 
investments. These pulls cannot continue for some time and whenever 
they stop the pulls the exchange rates will return to the previous levels 
mainly determined by current account transactions. Therefore, it might 
be wise to let exchange rates overshoot to a degree for the short period 
of time when sudden pulls are active in contrast to any trial to keep 
the rates within narrow range by using reserves, as far as exporters 
and others of current account transactions can be persuaded to be 
patient for the short variations associated with sudden pulls. The past 
practice of sticking to the adjustable rate system with a too narrow 
range may not be warranted. In this case the flexible rate system 
turned out to be a restraint to virulent capital flows. Letting the rates 
overshoot temporarily would also discourage the calculation of the pulls 
because they have to experience the disadvantaged price of exchange at 
the time of pull at the overshoot rates.  
C. Cooperation between Creditors and Debtors
Today’s financial crisis is associated with the huge capital flows 
among countries, whereas the capital flows have made some economy 
debtor and the other creditor. In the process of search for better ways 
of managing international capital movement and thereupon control 
their effects on financial market in the meantime, there appeared some 
discussions on how the creditor from whom the capital originated and 
the debtor to whom capital destined should do individually and then 
cooperatively. This aspect was quite important to emerging Asian 
economies that experienced 1998 financial crisis as debtor. But, its 
significance has increased with the newly revealed feature of global 
imbalance where U.S. portfolio management behavior is markedly 
different from those of others in the sense that U.S. has been a net 
capital importer and debtor, while she has actively exported some of 
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them in other countries in the form of higher risk-higher return 
investment, assuming creditor position in this regard even if she is a 
net debtor. 
Debtors were usually requested to behave prudently at an individual 
level just as Asian countries were during Asian financial crisis. As 
discussed above securing of transparent and foreigner-friendly system 
by debtors was recommended, in spite of the fact that it was not easy 
for a society with alternative traditions to the western ones to attain it. 
Besides, it was noticed that even totally transparent societies sometimes 
experienced bank runs and country runs, whereas not much trans- 
parent economy showed good performances.14 In the extreme, it was 
even warned that too much transparency can even exacerbate the 
instability in the crisis situation helping speculators coordinate on the 
timing of a run. For non-U.S. economies, at the opposite side of U.S., 
huge external reserves are nice collateral to foreign creditors. But, 
more than adequate reserves implies hidden costs. It is not reasonable 
to ignore the opportunity costs foregone in the foreign reserves judged 
too much. Adequate level of reserves together with their currency 
composition must be searched more seriously than before in the era 
after 2008 global financial crisis.
Recall the previous discussions that explained the global imbalance 
as a choice Asian countries gladly took in order to expand export in the 
guise of neo-mercantilism,15 or the explanation which cited the lack of 
financial development at home made Asians to invest in U.S. in search 
of better size, liquidity, transparency and efficiency by buying securities 
to overcome the dearth of good options at home.16 The discussions 
argued that U.S. happened to be a debtor passively as Asian economies 
were eager to secure collateral for U.S. FDI invitation or to equip them 
with nice U.S. issued financial assets. 
However, it seems that the role of the U.S. as an aggressive creditor 
instead of a role as a debtor looks to have met a turning point with 
14
In an address to the Chicago council on Foreign Relations, Joseph Stiglitz 
said that Nordic countries all being very transparent experienced financial crisis 
in early 1990s, while Germany never being very transparent had experienced no 
crisis. Recent bank runs and Fund runs in UK and US also confirm this point.
15
M. Dooley, P. Garber, and D. Folkerts-Landau, “The Two Crises of Interna- 
tional Economics.” NBER working paper 13197, 2007; J. Aizenman, “Large 
Holding of International Reserves and the Emerging Global Economic Architec- 
ture.” NBER working paper 13277, 2007.
16 K. Forbes, “Why Do Foreigners Invest in the United States?” NBER working 
paper, 13908, 2008.
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the current crisis. She took many new measures to handle this crisis 
including Federal Reserve assistance to investment banks and insurance 
companies with the rationalization of too-interconnected-to-fail (in 
distinction to the too-big-to-fail) and other inputs in the form of 
purchasing preferred stocks or common stocks of financial companies 
and some guarantees, accompanied by the talk on the use of bad bank 
apparatus. In essence, however, these measures were nothing but the 
emergency measure taken by the creditor U.S. to the debtor U.S. They 
were not the measures prepared beforehand in anticipation of crisis, 
but turned out de facto cooperative measure. Even if they may not be 
denoted as contingency measure of itself they were contingency measure 
invented in hurry by the creditor U.S. to the debtor U.S. Hence, this 
occasion must be made to be a momentum to introduce other con- 
tingency measures, not of self-help type only for U.S. but of natural 
cooperative type between potential creditors and potential debtors.     
In this sense, the asymmetric understanding of U.S. as a special 
debtor thus far sustained has to be changed with the current crisis. 
From now on with the fact that U.S. became more significant debtor 
not only to outsiders but also herself, she would better be to reposition 
herself savings more. The year-old argument that U.S. should save 
more and others export less with expanded domestic spending has to 
be recalled and reemphasized. In view of the possibility of global 
inflation owing to the massive liquidity released in the process of 
fighting against upcoming recession by many countries together with 
dollar devaluation, readjustments of various prices in devalued dollar 
have to be worked out, as the U.S. adjustments to resolve global 
imbalance are expected to be carried out in devalued dollar.  
At this turning point for seeing U.S. as both debtor and creditor it 
looks necessary to distinguish the monotonic discussion on the 
desirable role of debtor from those about the cooperative scheme 
between debtor and creditor. At an emergency situation it may be 
inevitable for individual economy to adopt unilateral and immediate 
solution, in view of the fact that attempts for cooperation usually 
requires quite much time. Otherwise, search for cooperative solution is 
much desirable. Besides, there are a few measures considered thus far 
even if they are of academic nature beyond immediate implementation.
The notable ideas suggested for cooperation along this line were (1) 
Collateralized credit facility sketched in Feldstein (1999) and (2) lending 
with covenant hinted in Wyplosz (1998).17
The former one is to create a facility explicitly with the provision of 
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collateral for the protection of the providers of credit. The facility 
enables continuation of credit supply even in abnormal situations 
through permitting drawing of credit on short notice by the borrower 
based on the condition specified in the contract of the facility. The 
most common collateral is trade receivable. The net effect of the facility 
is allowing of an option to borrow by the creditor to the debtor. 
Accordingly, it requires an explicit consent of the creditor before the 
date the option is to be exercised, and thus can be characterized as 
cooperation requiring.
The second one is concerned with relieving debtors from weight of 
debt payment at least temporarily in a crisis situation. It intends to 
incorporate covenant that allows stopping the clock of debt payment 
while maintaining market access. For this purpose it tries to change 
the current practice of lending contract, by incorporating clauses that 
could even take care of any possible outcome from speculative crises. 
Embedding the covenant into the contract would never be easy; 
therefore, it involves a cooperation that can be secured in complicated 
ways. 
Thus far the U.S. has been an abnormal debtor with no creditor 
demanding such things associated with conditionality to her in stark 
distinction to the Asian debtors at 1998 Asian crisis times. In addition, 
there are reasons for this asymmetric treatment. One reason might be 
that U.S. was too big and too strong a country such that there could 
not be any stronger creditor giving sufficient new credit to her (or 
withdrawing past credits from her) and at the same time demanding 
many things as for the condition of credit arrangement. Another reason 
might be that U.S. might not be a desperate debtor since she has other 
means than seeking credits out of herself. Indeed, she is the key 
currency country having the power to print dollar whereas dollar turns 
into the most sought medium when crisis is imminent and critical.
The cooperative ways between creditor and debtor seen above may 
better be reinvestigated. Much more contingency facilities could be 
utilized. U.S. hasty response to credit crunch and delayed but finally 
taken coordination among G7 countries in the area of fiscal stimulus 
have to be re-interpreted with the recognition that U.S. position dis- 
closed in its essence involved nothing but a feature of critical debtor. 
17
The self-help measures may be supplementary to the gradual financial 
reform, that is very recommendable when upfront fixed reform cost is big and 
the volume of financial transaction after reform cannot be great (Lee 2006).
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The cooperation measures can better be examined with year-old issue 
of global imbalance associated with a fear of hard landing as will be 
touched later.
As for a first step forward along the direction, in order to install a 
little symmetry from the previous asymmetric posture between center 
U.S. and peripheral emerging economies, the emergency swap agreement 
among G7 has to be extended to significant emerging economies, 
beyond the level U.S. took only with a few emerging economies such as 
Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, and Korea. In case the swap is opposed, on 
account of the fact that the currencies of emerging economies are not 
convertible, another kind of swap between U.S. dollar and U.S. Treasury 
Bonds has to be guaranteed in view of the fact that some emerging 
economies have some U.S. Bonds in their external reserves. Thereafter, 
when the emerging economies are noticed to be victim of U.S. originated 
crisis, some standby facility to use against temporary dollar shortage 
may better be provided to them. Other means must be devised to make 
other debtors a bit more similar to the debtor U.S. by the creditor U.S.
  
VI. Final Remarks
It was discovered that shadow banking sector consisting of invest- 
ment banks, hedge funds, insurance companies and others has played 
a critical role like orthodox banking sector in the 2008 crisis, whereas 
it has not been regulated as banking sector. The companies in the 
shadow banking abused the loose regulatory structure that was unable 
to catch up with the developments in the sector. Consequently they 
happened to have respective high leverage ratios, and that in turn have 
resulted in current financial crisis. Anyhow, the credit crunch as- 
sociated with the difficulties of bank market had spread to insurance 
market, car market, and hedge fund market resulting in a sort of hard 
landing, not only lots of turmoil in all sectors but also in the form of 
potential dollar depreciation. The outcome of high leverage is the same 
as that observed in the Asian financial crisis, except it was materialized 
by the shadow banking sector this time. In addition, U.S. financial 
authorities employed exceptional measures such as the FRB’s direct 
purchasing of asset-backed securities (meaning the FRB direct lending 
to non-bank), and the U.S. Treasury department purchasing of common 
equities.
As for a remedial measure, the loose capital provisioning with 
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respect to companies in the shadow banking sector should be corrected 
comparable to that of the orthodox banking. Furthermore, The notion 
of dynamic provisioning can be introduced to take care of the pro- 
cyclicality of financial activities noticed missing even in the BIS 
requirement. The so-called dynamic provisioning which enhances capital 
provision at the time of upswing of cycle and the other way around at 
the time of downswing could be institutionalized in all economies. 
Regulatory system must be rearranged to avoid the loose regulation, 
especially with respect to derivative products. Use of clearing houses 
for the trade of derivatives and timely reporting by the shadow banking 
institutions on their holdings to the relevant regulators will be helpful 
to better comprehend a new big architecture of financial wonder world. 
In addition, in view of un-predictable and serious events as observed  
in 2008 financial crisis, some discretionary judgment exercised by 
responsible human being may formally have to be secured against 
abnormal and extreme situation.  
At the beginning of the depression of the developed economies under 
the crisis, at least for a brief period, the emerging economies were once 
considered a rescue team in supplementing weakened global demand. 
However, the contamination of U.S. crisis to others rendered the need 
of supplementation unfilled. Conversely, real side of them was 
ameliorated through the contractions of export and import between 
developed economies and developing economies. Emerging economies’ 
hardship was further increased in the withdrawal of loans from 
advanced countries’ banks with a feature of sudden pull, together with 
the similar pulls by hedge funds of developed economies, and in the 
unwinding of carry trade actively pursued owing to the relatively low 
interest rates in Japan and U.S. during last 3 years or so. 
It can be said today’s financial crisis was magnified to a global scale 
with the increased capital flows among countries in a sense. The 
capital flows turned into a mechanism for propagation of crisis, making 
some economies debtors and the others creditors at the same time with 
the risk associated with both debtor and creditor generating 
unprecedented counterparty risk. Then, stock market indices and 
exchange rates of emerging economies all showed red sign in the midst 
of search for safe haven of dollar and yen by the capital previously 
invested in the emerging economies. The symptom of sudden pull was 
at first regarded as liquidity problem, but as time passed the shortage 
of liquidity drove many firms there into solvency difficulties close to a 
panic via counterparty risk.
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In addition, with this crisis U.S. established the status as the debtor 
as well as the creditor, in the sense that the developed part of America 
gave credit to the developing part of America that depended on the 
sub-prime mortgage far ahead of all other debtors and creditors. U.S. 
became major creditor to U.S. herself, and at the same time she 
became ever bigger debtor to herself, in addition to other countries, 
aggravating the extent of global imbalance accumulated before this 
crisis. From now on U.S. should be made to play a double role both as 
the debtor as well as the creditor at the same time. 
But unfairly enough, at least at the initial stage of dealing with the 
crisis the obligations of debtor so much emphasized to Asian debtors in 
1998 were disappeared from the concern and autonomous measures 
taken by U.S. became prominent occupying front pages. The debtor’s 
duty was extinguished as U.S. appeared as debtor, and there was no 
creditor demanding such things observed in the Asian crisis to her. 
In the broad scheme of international management of capital move- 
ment, the individual debtors without exception should be requested to 
behave prudently as Asian countries were during Asian financial crisis. 
The drastic change that turned the request of prudential behavior to be 
non-operating all of sudden when U.S. appeared the debtor in 2008 
crisis must be discarded from now on. U.S. should not be an exception 
automatically and permanently. A few measures tossed as to what 
creditors would do alongside with what debtors would do may better be 
brought in. Moreover, when the fact that U.S. is the really serious 
debtor country concerned with the issue of the global imbalance and 
the possibility of hard landing is to be recalled, the need appears more 
imminent and significant.
In devising better ways of managing international capital movement 
in a fundamental way the old discussions on how the creditor from 
whom the capital originated and the debtor to whom capita destined 
should do individually and then cooperatively should be digested with 
enhanced seriousness than before. Asymmetries between the debtor 
U.S. and other non-U.S. debtors must be reduced. More transparency 
and deleveraging must be pursued by the both simultaneously, and 
common regulatory scheme must be applied to them, at least with 
respect to rating (including less reliance on privileged rating agencies 
enforced institutionally), clearing of derivatives, and common financial 
architecture.
U.S. huge current account deficits have been significant concern and 
will be more significant in the future when the various effects of 2008 
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financial crisis were taken into account. Previous discussions that 
explained the global imbalance primarily as the reflection of the choice 
Asian countries had made to expand exports in the guise of 
neo-mercantilism or the appetite for developed financial products 
cannot be sustained further. U.S. new position as a less special 
country than before with the ill-service to other countries besides the 
Europe’s relative rise must be taken into the new picture constituting a 
background for fresh start of discussions on global cooperative system. 
As the degree of globalization and intensity of the global imbalance 
would be more amplified after a few years of U.S.’s much more 
aggressive stimulus effort than those of others, the debtor status of 
U.S. will become more vivid. In resolving global imbalance the obvious 
fact that U.S. is a serious debtor (even though it is somewhat 
unnatural to regard U.S. as conventional sovereign debtor) must be 
seriously taken into account. Therefore the old logic on transfer 
problem discussed about with German reparation problem after World 
War I must be recalled in the sense that the debtor would have to be 
transferee to receive quite much of real resources to overcome the 
status yielding the transfer problem. U.S. would be the major bene- 
ficiary from the transfer, which in turn may lower U.S. debts to others 
through dollar depreciation expected from her aggressive stimulus 
packages.
In attaining the outcome, a hasty neglect of the cooperative pos- 
sibility between creditors and debtors is not warranted. In spite of 
many past explanations why the global imbalance was not as serious 
problem as usually thought and many claims that such a judgment 
has been vindicated by the fact that hard landing has not yet been 
observed until present time, the previous optimistic views had to be 
modified to accommodate the new feature that U.S. is both debtor and 
creditor after this worldwide financial crisis of 2008. The global 
imbalance magnified after this crisis may accelerate the real hard 
landing.
The hard landing would involve dramatic price changes in many 
economies pioneered by U.S. dollar depreciation, in reflection of U.S. 
massive fiscal stimulus package far larger than others’ and her smaller 
real debts after the transfer. It implies nothing but a vast liquidity glut 
on this globe much larger than the size of glut pinpointed by Bernanke 
before the crisis, hinting a danger of worldwide inflation sooner or 
later. Its magnitude would surely be very huge. Moreover, it is painful 
to notice that there is no easy ways to undo it when the U.S. wants to 
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curtail inflation later, since the monetary expansion mainly takes the 
form of Federal Reserve purchase of long-term government debts and 
mortgage backed securities. With longer maturity of long term govern- 
ment bonds than the period of materialization of inflation expected to 
be of 18 months or so and small marketability of mortgage securities, 
the inflation once generated by the stimulus packages to fight against 
deflation would stay put thereafter. 
At the same time, when the transfer problem is recalled, it must be 
made to involve some transfer from the rest of the world to U.S., as 
U.S. would remain a major economy even after this crisis being much 
more important than losers in the World War I. With some transfer, 
though, the asymmetries between U.S. and non-U.S. economies as for 
a debtor will be diluted. This aspect of ameliorating remaining asym- 
metries to some degree may be much important to Asian economies, as 
at the 1998 financial crisis they faced difficulties noted to have 
originated from their failures while they happened to experience spill- 
over hardships from U.S.-originated crisis this time. Indeed, they would 
have experienced relatively smaller sacrifice than otherwise if the 
amelioration from the external spill-over of current financial crisis was 
not there.
New positive measures have to be taken on the ground that both 
U.S. and non-U.S. are treated more symmetrically. In consideration of 
many self-help measures taken in 2008 by U.S. to avoid credit freeze 
and to sustain liquidity flows through sectors of her economy, other 
similar self-help measures of their choice in non-U.S. economies in 
parallel to the U.S. choices must be warranted. The decision by China 
and Russia to use their currencies as for the invoicing vehicle of their 
trade would mean a first step of this kind deviating from the tradition 
of using U.S. dollar for the most of international transactions. In 
addition, the extended swap arrangement which does play a role of de 
facto inter-bank market in today’s global community would better be 
further utilized to comprise many emerging economies (beyond G7 and 
a few others) in view of the extended vicious circle among developed 
economies and developing economies. In this sense, the swap arrange- 
ment between U.S. and such selected emerging economies as Brazil, 
Mexico, Singapore, and Korea looks another positive step in this 
dimension, but it should be expanded further. It is critical as a way to 
formulate a global inter-bank market, especially when the swap between 
U.S. Treasury Bonds in the external reserves of emerging economies 
with U.S. dollar cannot be guaranteed. 
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Newly devised IMF’s short term liquidity facility for providing dollars 
to emerging economies would better be taken into account in this 
context instituting a move for IMF towards the direction of global 
central liquidity provider. The move for the Asian currency needs to be 
reattempted, too. 
Freedom to respond to exchange market pressure in choosing an 
appropriate mix between exchange rate variation and reserve variation 
could be more widely allowed. New additional means to facilitate credit 
circulation to obviate credit squeeze at its root should be investigated 
and the other good means might be gladly introduced. Preparatory 
means could be devised cooperatively and simultaneously to avoid 
regulatory arbitrage. Deposit insurance to restore trust of depositors 
could be made necessary to all countries with a little variation in the 
country-specific measures. Consolidated supervisory authority to take 
care of daily regulation and to monitor work-outs should be made 
available with accompanying necessary information on global market 
happenings.  
In the meantime, it should not be forgotten that both the massive 
liquidity newly supplied needed to be distributed into many individual 
countries to prevent a stopping/standstill of credit circulation and so is 
the supplementary swap arrangement which has constituted a de facto 
international inter-bank market. More swap arrangements could be 
supplemented with some flexible contingency facilities.
In view of the notion of hard landing denoted above, it can be 
reasoned that the hard landing is nothing but one that has increased 
its significance after 2008 global financial crisis in the form of dollar 
depreciation potential, as U.S. would have been the most aggressive in 
carrying demand expansion than others. She would rightly pursue 
strong stimulus packages to prevent deflation ahead of the worry on 
the fiscal soundness. The U.S. fiscal problem resulting from it might 
bring international crowding out. This will accelerate dollar deprecia- 
tion in the end. When the fact that the major part of newly added 
liquidity is in dollar (reflecting U.S. rescue financing and most swap 
arrangements are main component) is confirmed, the big depreciation 
of dollar is easily expected. The bigger the dollar depreciation is, the 
higher would be the chance of hard landing. This enforces us to 
coordinate the current concern on depression from credit squeeze with 
the danger of hard landing accompanied by severe inflation.
It can be speculated that the global imbalance would be partly 
resolved with quite much of dollar depreciation. In that way the real 
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debt burden of U.S. can be lessoned on the one hand, and that the 
still remaining U.S. external debts would be diminished over time with 
U.S. effort to increase savings towards the resolution of global imbalance 
on the other.
Last, but not the least, it is observed that financial crises in 
developed economies had hurt even very poor developing economies. 
Accordingly, it would be imperative to consider an ODA (official 
development assistance) type stimulus package (in the form of 
vulnerability fund) destined to those unable to afford either bailout or 
deficits on their own, in order not to abandon them.18
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